Still haven't sussed out what my stance on abortion is since abandoning my hardline inspired pro life stance a few years back but i had an essay to do for philosophy class covering this issue and this is what i got....
Abortion infamously is a difficult issue to grasp as it is concerned with at the heart with the interests of the mother and with what may be the competing interests of a fetus. This problem is further compounded by the emotive nature of this issue which attracts extreme opinions. One camp, the religious pro life fraternity assert that human life begins at the fertilization of the egg and that purposely ending its development is tantamount to murder in the same way that killing ends the development of a human. One the other side, some from the radical feminist camp assert absolute autonomy of a woman to do what she wills over her body and any infringement of her autonomy is an attack on women. Most people, intuitively fall somewhere in between these two conclusions.
This essay will attempt to find a philosophical justification for this ‘in-between’ conclusion by asking the question of whether there are essential moral differences between infanticide, abortion and contraception. In the course of this I will argue that there are essential moral differences between contraception on the one hand and abortion and infanticide on the other hand. I will then argue that with regards to making a moral distinction between abortion and infanticide differences can be drawn out but these differences are not of an essential characteristic due to the evolving moral status of the fetus as it develops. I will examine Tooley’s famous argument in favor of infanticide and by extension abortion. Unlike Tooley, however, I will argue that infanticide is wrong on his grounds and will also be applicable to late term abortions at least.
Tooley’s discussion on abortion begins with an examination of the conservative challenge to liberal thinkers on the abortion question. The typical conservative and liberal position is both agreed that infanticide is wrong. The conservative challenge to the liberal emerges from the liberal sharing this same assumption by establishing the factual truth that there is a continual line of development from zygote to a newborn baby. The challenge then emerges that “…if one says it is seriously wrong to destroy a human baby but not a zygote or some intermediate stage in the development of a human being one should be prepared to point to a morally relevant difference between a newborn baby and the earlier stage in the development of a human being[1].”
This gives rise to what Tooley describes as the ‘liberal problem[2]’ which is to establish what this morally relevant difference is between a newborn baby and an earlier stage of its development. The typical liberal response is to attempt make a distinction between a ‘potential human being’ which is the foetus at a stage where it does not possess requisite attributes rendering it suitable for moral concern and a ‘person’ which has certain attributes to render it as worthy of our moral concern. Various stages have been offered as potential cut off points such as the acquisition of human form, brain activity, movement etc. However, Tooley observes that it is next to impossible for the liberal to offer such a characteristic without being open to the charge of being arbitrary in their determination.
Furthermore, the liberal by positing such possible attributes also has to grasp with the issue of infanticide since attributes offered are often of a similar nature to a newborn baby. Given that most people would not entertain an allowance of infanticide makes the liberal position on the grounds of personhood shaky in contrast to the conservative position. Tooley, rather than bow down to pressure the liberal faces on the personhood argument by succumbing to the power of what he describes as a ‘taboo rather than rational prohibition[3]’ by not entertaining infanticide, carries on the logic of the personhood argument and concludes that infanticide is acceptable. We now turn to an exposition of Tooley’s position on infanticide before detailing my criticism of it.
Tooley’s approach is to “set out and defend a moral principal specifying a condition an organism must satisfy if it is to have a serious right to life[4]”. The moral principal is that ‘x is a person is synonymous with x has a serious moral right to life’. Thus if an entity has the qualities personhood it is worthy of moral consideration. The next step is to find what characteristics qualify an organism as being a person. Tooley states that the qualities of personhood are to have the “concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states and believes that it is itself a continuing entity[5]”. But how can one know that an entity has this concept? This is done through an entity having desires. If an entity has desires, it has a stake in possessing something in relation to itself so it must have a concept of itself i.e. self consciousness. This ‘self consciousness requirement’ renders an entity worthy of moral concern. Adult humans, children, certain animals all display desires and thus have a concept of itself.
Newborn babies and by extension foetuses, Tooley believes, do not display desires and thus do not qualify as persons and therefore does not possesses a serious right to life. He seems unable to give a cut off time as to when a baby possesses the concept of a continuing self. He tentatively suggests that infanticide would be permissible up to the time that “an organism learned how to use certain expressions” before remarking as to the unsatisfactory nature of determining this level of consciousness on the acquisition of language as this would exclude entities that he believes display desires in other ways. If one can demonstrate that a newborn baby does have this level of consciousness then Tooley’s allowance for infanticide is clearly wrong. This will be shown to have implications for the moral status of foetuses at a late stage of development.
Anybody who has ever raised a child will testify that a newborn baby is very vociferous at expressing its desires to be given the things it needs to continue to exist. It does this through crying, a mode of communication that it uses to get another actor to respond to. Thus it has the conceptual knowledge of feeding, comfort and discomfort, and other beings who it communicates with through crying. Newborn babies are very adept at expressing their desires; paradoxically it seems therefore that Tooley’s desire based argument in favour of infanticide acts against that practice. Furthermore, newborn babies born prematurely display the same characteristics as a full term newborn baby. It seems therefore that foetuses at the point of viability have moral status.
It appears that we are back full circle to the liberal problem and the conservative challenge remains. The conservative posits that there is a continuous line of development from the zygote to the newborn baby. I will not argue against that premise as it is self evident. When conception takes place a new entity begins that has its own unique
Since it has been established that infanticide is wrong can we find a cut-off time that is not open to the charge of being arbitrary? I believe we can use Tooley’s self consciousness requirement to do so. The stage would be where the foetus acquires self consciousness. Although this does not help as we do not know when this consciousness precisely would arise it would be wise to err on the side of caution and allow brain activity to represent this cut-off stage as this is a necessary condition for self consciousness. Given that brain activity is the building block of consciousness we can at least surmise that abortions carried out prior to the development of a brain are not morally problematic.
To conclude, the central question underpinning this essay asks are there essential moral differences between infanticide, abortion and contraception?. In the course of exploring this issue I have ascertained that contraception does not pose any moral problem as it does not concern the interests of another party. By accepting the conservative premise “that there is a continuous line of development from the zygote to the newborn baby” one is forced to deal with questions concerning another entity apart from the pregnant woman in the abortion question. Thus, there is a essential moral difference between contraception on the one hand and abortion and infanticide on the other. In the course of ascertaining the moral rightness of infanticide I have confronted Tooley’s mistaken view that a newborn baby does not show desires requisite of a being with self consciousness. Thus, infanticide cannot be defended. This returns us to the ‘liberal problem’ of ascertaining a cut off point between a foetal entity deserving moral consideration and one that does not. I have used Tooley’s self consciousness requirement to make the cut-off stage as measurable brain activity as brain activity is a basic makeup of consciousness. Thus abortions after this stage present a more murky moral landscape and one would have to proceed with a careful weighing up of the mothers interests and the interests of the foetus before deciding to undertake a medical intervention.
Word Count 1585
Bibliography
Tooley, M, Abortion and Infanticide, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 2, No. 1 (Autumn 1972)
